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PUNISHMENT BY THE PEOPLE:  
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IN ASSIGNING PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade the Supreme Court did something—twice—it 
has never done before: it struck down a punitive damages award for 
violating the United States Constitution.1 In each case, the awards 
had been determined by an elaborate choreography, including the 
parties and their respective counsel, a jury of disinterested laypeople, 
and a trial judge. Moreover, the jury in each case made a moral 
judgment consistent with state constitutional requirements about how 
much money the defendant should be required to pay as punishment 
for wrongdoing.2 But the United States Supreme Court found both 
punishments “grossly excessive,”3 violating the Due Process Clause of 
 
Copyright © 2007 by Nathan Seth Chapman. 
 1. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (“The 
punitive award of $145 million, therefore, was neither reasonable nor proportionate to the 
wrong committed, and it was an irrational and arbitrary deprivation of the property of the 
defendant.”); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996) (“[W]e are fully 
convinced that the grossly excessive award imposed in this case transcends the constitutional 
limit.”). But see Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 491 (1915) (invalidating a 
statutory award for $6,300 against a telephone company for discrimination against a customer 
because the award “was so plainly arbitrary and oppressive as to be nothing short of a taking of 
its property without due process of law”). 
 2. In Gore, the Alabama Supreme Court remitted the $4 million punitive damages award 
entered on the jury verdict to $2 million after “thoroughly and painstakingly reviewing [the] jury 
award.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 629 (Ala. 1994). In Campbell, the 
Supreme Court of Utah reinstated a $145 million jury punitive damages award that the trial 
judge had remitted to $25 million. Campbell v. State Farm, 65 P.3d 1134, 1141, 1171–72 (Utah 
2001). 
 3. In TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993), the Supreme Court 
first applied the “grossly excessive” test to a punitive damages award. Id. at 458 (borrowing the 
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the Fourteenth Amendment.4 The next time the Court reviews the 
constitutionality of a punitive damages award it should consider that 
it may do more than upset the jury’s historical role if it pulls the rug 
out from under the jury’s award. The Court’s current approach may 
be tipping a political balance in favor of the unelected federal 
judiciary. The jury plays an important political role as a 
counterbalance to the professional judiciary, particularly as a source 
of morality. 
This Note argues that the jury’s most historically significant 
purpose is not given adequate respect in current punitive damages 
doctrine. Even the Justices who recognize the jury’s traditional role in 
assigning punitive damages5 neglect the political rationale for this 
historical role. Particularly by applying community moral standards to 
its judgments, the American jury has consistently served as a 
counterbalance to the professional judiciary. Accordingly, this Note 
asserts that the jury’s punitive damages award should be given some 
deference by federal appellate courts, and that courts can do so 
without compromising Fourteenth Amendment limits on punitive 
discretion. 
Part I narrates the jury’s function in assigning civil punishment, 
from its origins as a monarchical pawn to its role—in the words of the 
Supreme Court—as “a quintessential government body . . . . [that] 
exercises the power of the court and of the government that confers 
the court’s jurisdiction.”6 To assess the scope of the jury’s political 
role, Part I explores the jury’s history in general, not only its role in 
the imposition of punitive damages. It releases the reader’s 
 
term of art from Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909), a decision about 
unconstitutional fines). 
 4. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (“The punitive award of $145 million, therefore, was 
neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed, and it was an irrational and 
arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defendant.”); Gore, 517 U.S. at 585–86 (finding a 
“grossly excessive” punitive damage award violative of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 5. Gore, 517 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“At the time of adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it was well understood that punitive damages represent the assessment 
by the jury, as the voice of the community, of the measure of punishment the defendant 
deserved.”); id. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s readiness to superintend state-
court punitive damages awards is all the more puzzling in view of the Court’s longstanding 
reluctance to countenance review, even by courts of appeals, of the size of verdicts returned by 
juries in federal district court proceedings.”). 
 6. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991). Also, “the jury system 
performs the critical governmental functions of guarding the rights of litigants and ‘ensur[ing] 
continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people.’” Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 
400, 407 (1991)). 
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imagination from the confines of an empirical approach that might be 
missing the forest of the jury’s political function for the trees of 
predictability and efficiency. 
Part II argues that the jury’s political role is constitutional. The 
Constitution’s text,7 the balance of powers it creates, and various 
constitutional doctrines8 all point to the jury’s important political role 
in the republic as a democratic source of morality in the law.9 
Recognizing the jury’s political role is a partial, albeit insufficient, 
solution to the ongoing scholarly debates over how to inject 
democratic values into the constitutional adjudicative process and 
how to instill constitutional virtues into the citizenry. 
Part III details the current due process standards for punitive 
damages and the constitutional concerns implicated by unfair punitive 
damages awards. The Court has limited the jury’s power to punish 
civil wrongdoing in two significant ways: it has suggested that a 
punitive damages award exceeding nine times the amount of 
compensatory damages is rarely constitutional,10 and it has held that 
neither trial judges nor appellate courts should defer to a jury’s 
assessment of reprehensibility.11 The Court’s overriding concern is 
 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment has not 
been applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 
n.6 (1974). Both federal and state criminal trials require a jury because the Sixth Amendment is 
applied against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968), unless an accused elects to waive a jury trial, Patton v. 
United States, 281 U.S. 276, 308 (1930). 
 8. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (prohibiting gender-
based discrimination in jury selection); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363–64 (1991) 
(allowing trial judges to weigh justifications for peremptory challenges that lead to 
disproportionate exclusion of members of certain ethnic groups); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79, 84 (1986) (prohibiting the denial of jury participation on account of race). 
 9. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607–09 (2002) (holding that the jury must find the 
aggravating factors that warrant a death sentence); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33–34 
(1973) (requiring the jury to determine whether material’s dominant theme appeals to a 
prurient interest and violates community standards of decency, and so amounts to unprotected 
obscenity under the First Amendment); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280–81 (1964) 
(allowing instructions to the jury to determine whether a false statement about a public official 
was made with malice, and thus not protected by the First Amendment). 
 10. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (“Our 
jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however, that, in practice, 
few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a 
significant degree, will satisfy due process.”). 
 11. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) (“[C]ourts of 
appeals should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district courts’ 
determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.”). 
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fairness: Civil defendants who are subjected to a completely 
unpredictable punishment are not fairly afforded the protection of 
the rule of law.12 
Finally, Part IV suggests that, consistent with the jury’s political 
function, the Court should give juries more deference to apply 
community standards of morality in the imposition of punitive 
damages. Instead of de novo application of the Gore guideposts, the 
Court should adopt one of three doctrinal options: (1) an “abuse of 
discretion” review with reference to the Gore guideposts, (2) the 
traditional “clearly arbitrary” or “clearly excessive” standard of 
review, or (3) a hybrid rule requiring the jury to apply the Gore 
guideposts and judicial review for “abuse of discretion.” After 
analyzing the practical and constitutional strengths and weaknesses of 
each, this Note ultimately recommends the last option. 
I.  THE JURY’S STORY REVEALS ITS ESSENTIALLY  
POLITICAL CHARACTER 
The American jury’s story is steeped in political drama. This Part 
recounts the chapters of the jury’s story that are necessary to 
understand what is at stake when the professional judiciary ignores a 
jury’s punitive damages award. The history of the American jury is 
one facet of the ongoing story of American self-determination; the 
constant flux in the scope and degree of power exercised by the jury 
vis-à-vis the professional judge is evidence of America’s singular and 
ongoing attempt to make popular sovereignty work. 
A. The Jury’s Origin: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty 
The clearest starting point of what became the American jury is 
probably the Frankish inquisitio, which evolved into the judgment 
jury after its introduction to Great Britain.13 The most important facet 
 
 12. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“Requiring the application of law, rather than a decisionmaker’s caprice, does more than 
simply provide citizens notice of what actions may subject them to punishment; it also helps to 
assure the uniform general treatment of similarly situated persons that is the essence of law 
itself.”). 
 13. LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 14 (2d ed. 
1988). But see VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 23 (1986) (recounting 
early Anglo-Saxon inquisitions as being the first instances of a jury in English legal history). 
Scholars Maitland and Thayer focus on the legacy of the Normans in the development of the 
jury, while Dawson focuses on the pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon tradition as the jury’s source. 
Compare 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
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of the inquisitio for the purposes of this Note is that it operated at the 
whim of the King.14 Although members swore to testify to the truth 
regardless of its impact on the King,15 because an inquisitio was only 
available if the King permitted, the crown could prevent any 
damaging judgments by refusing to institute an inquisitio.16 Further, a 
sort of judicial review guaranteed the inquisitio’s loyalty to the 
Crown: unless they ruled for the King, members of an inquisitio 
suspected of perjury were subject to an ordeal.17 But by the end of the 
fourteenth century, partly due to a prohibition of ecclesiastical 
participation in the ordeal,18 and perhaps partly due to the economic 
prudence of employing laymen,19 the jury largely had evolved from a 
panel of witnesses into a judgment jury.20 
Although the early judgment jury bore a resemblance to the 
modern American jury—for instance, it typically comprised twelve 
lay persons and was empowered to make decisions of fact—it had 
several distinctions.21 First, the purpose of a local jury early on was to 
serve as a character witness or eyewitness. By the period’s end, 
however, the jury’s primary purpose was to empower the community 
affected by the legal dispute to effectuate its own notions of fairness. 
Second, the judgment jury frequently was composed of members of 
the presenting jury.22 The presenting jury was a holdover from the 
compurgator jury, which essentially ratified the government’s 
accusations based on first-hand experience with the facts. Thus, it 
functioned like a modern grand jury. It was assumed this experience 
would facilitate a just deliberation of the full merits of the case, and 
thus many presentment members were retained as jurors of the same 
 
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 74 (Lawbook Exchange 1996) (2d ed.1898), 
and JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON 
LAW 50 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898), with JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY 
JUDGES 118–20 (1960). 
 14. MOORE, supra note 13, at 14. 
 15. Id. at 16. 
 16. Id. at 14. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 
44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 584 (1992). 
 19. DAWSON, supra note 13, at 293. 
 20. MOORE, supra note 13, at 56. 
 21. See id. at 65–68 (detailing the evolution of jury composition from the fifteenth to the 
eighteenth centuries, including jury size, social status of jurors, exemptions, and challenges 
available to counsel). 
 22. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 13, at 28. 
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trial.23 Third, and most importantly here, the Crown ensured the 
partiality of juries to its own agenda through two procedural 
mechanisms: jurors were selected by a sheriff who “in respect of his 
allegiance . . . ought to favor the king,”24 and until the remarkable trial 
of Quaker William Penn in 1670, jurors were frequently put under 
overwhelming pressure to comply with a judge’s “suggestions.”25 
The story of the Penn trial and the subsequent habeas corpus 
action brought by Edward Bushell, one of the Penn jurors, is often 
recounted as the forebear of the truly independent jury. The Penn 
jurors were deprived of food, water, and a chamber pot until they 
rendered a proper verdict against the defendant for unlawfully 
preaching in public as a non-Anglican. Penn, acting as his own 
counsel, encouraged the jurors to withstand the judge’s pressure and 
vote their consciences, as befitting subjects of the Great Charter.26 
After days of foul conditions and deprivation, during which several of 
the jurors fell ill, the jury ultimately acquitted Penn of unlawfully 
preaching in public.27 The court immediately sent every juror to 
Newgate prison for contempt of court. Edward Bushell, considered 
the jury’s leading voice, won his habeas corpus action in light of the 
court’s jury abuse, and ultimately the jury’s decision was affirmed and 
enforced. 
Little did Bushell know that the legacy of his habeas case,28 
unremarkable except for its context, would greatly surpass that of 
Penn’s case. Chief Justice of Common Pleas Sir John Vaughan 
memorialized the jury’s ability to make an independent decision 
without fear of judicial reprisal.29 The decision cemented a barrier 
between the function of the jury and the function of the professional 
judiciary. Since then, the common law has respected a jury’s decision 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. W. FORSYTHE, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 191 n.1 (Lawbook Exchange 1994) (1875). 
 25. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 13, at 28 (“It was not until after juror Bushell won his 
case that jurors became truly immune to legal sanctions concerning their verdicts.”); see also 
MOORE, supra note 13, at 72–73 (describing the Star Court’s imposition of fines for verdicts of 
acquittal); id. at 76–77 (detailing the potential penalties for attaint, or rendering a false verdict). 
 26. GODFREY D. LEHMAN, WE THE JURY . . . THE IMPACT OF JURORS ON OUR BASIC 
FREEDOMS 45–46 (1997) (presenting that portion of the Penn trial in narrative form). 
 27. Id. at 61. Juries at this time frequently returned special verdicts, finding the facts of a 
case but leaving the application of law to the judge. MOORE, supra note 13, at 71. 
 28. Bushell’s Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.). 
 29. Landsman, supra note 18, at 590. 
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regarding how (and sometimes whether) the law governing them 
applies to a set of facts arising from its community. 
Bushell’s Case set the stage for the Seven Bishops Case30 in 1688, 
in which a jury acquitted a group of Anglican bishops of seditious 
libel.31 The case launched the Glorious Revolution, established the 
jury as a “‘bulwark of liberty’” against monarchal abuse, and 
prompted a slew of popular treatises lauding the jury.32 In both the 
Penn case and the Seven Bishops Case, the jury nullified legislation 
and rebuffed an abusive professional judiciary. 
In 1763, while American juries were playing an important role in 
the colonies’ struggle for self-rule, English juries first awarded 
modern punitive damages as a remedy for civil wrongdoing in the 
companion cases of Wilkes v. Wood33 and Huckle v. Money.34 In 
Wilkes, the plaintiff publisher of an allegedly libelous pamphlet, The 
North Briton,35 succeeded with an action for trespass against the 
King’s agents who searched and seized his property on a general 
warrant. A relatively enormous jury award (£1000)36 was allowed as 
punishment, deterrence, and an expression of juror disgust.37 In 
Huckle v. Money, the same pamphlet’s printer was illegally seized and 
imprisoned. Lord Camden upheld a £300 award despite only £20 
worth of damages, believing the jury justified in imposing a severe 
sanction against an exercise of arbitrary power that threatened liberty 
under the Magna Carta of all Englishmen. He postulated: 
[I]t is very dangerous for the Judges to intermeddle in damages for 
torts; it must be a glaring case indeed of outrageous damages in a 
 
 30. Seven Bishops Case, (1688) 87 Eng. Rep. 136 (K.B.). 
 31. Landsman, supra note 18, at 590. 
 32. Id. at 590–91 (quoting Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil 
Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV. 669, 676 (1918)). 
 33. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.). 
 34. Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B.). 
 35. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 493. 
 36. There is disagreement about the value of the award compared to today’s awards, 
depending on the method used to estimate the inflation rate. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559, 594–95, 597–98 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) (finding divergent results using 
different methods to calculate the present day value of the jury awards in Wilkes and Huckle). 
 37. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498–99 (Lord Camden wrote, “[A] jury have [sic] it in their 
power to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages are designed not only as a 
satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any 
such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action 
itself.”). 
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tort, and which all mankind at first blush must think so, to induce a 
Court to grant a new trial for excessive damages.38 
Even though the jury long before had evolved into a neutral, 
objective fact finder,39 Lord Camden’s deference to the jury’s award 
in Wilkes may have extended the traditional common law reliance on 
the juror’s personal knowledge of the nature of the harm and the 
relative blameworthiness of the defendant.40 
Juries and judges had been awarding punitive damages in select 
categories of cases since before 1700, but after Wilkes and Huckle, 
punitive damages were assessed with increasing frequency and in new 
types of cases.41 Besides physical injury,42 multiple damages were 
awarded for wounded honor and breached promises.43 The jury 
furthered the crusade begun in the North Britain cases against 
government abuse,44 and American juries added corporate 
malfeasance to the list of targets.45 In the latter two types of cases, the 
jury responded to a defendant’s behavior that threatened the liberty 
of the whole community through an abuse of political or economic 
advantage.46 This popular sentiment later dovetailed with the jury’s 
rise in America as an instrument of democracy. 
 
 38. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769. 
 39. Alan Calnan, Ending the Punitive Damage Debate, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 101, 106–07 
(1995). 
 40. See 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 6 n.31 (5th ed. 2005) (“Juries under 
early English common law typically consisted of townsmen who were more familiar with the 
nature of the dispute and the harm committed than the judge himself.”). 
 41. Calnan, supra note 39, at 107. 
 42. See Towle v. Blake, 48 N.H. 92, 96 (1868) (punishing violent tort); Grey v. Grant, 
(1764) 95 Eng. Rep. 794, 795 (K.B.) (justifying punitive damages as an alternative to a duel 
when one “gentleman” has struck another). 
 43. See Severance v. Hilton, 32 N.H. 289, 291 (1855) (punishing malicious slander); 
Davidson v. Goodall, 18 N.H. 423, 430–31 (1846) (punishing seduction); Chesley v. Chesley, 10 
N.H. 327, 328 (1839) (punishing breach of a promise to marry). 
 44. See Benson v. Frederick, (1776) 97 Eng. Rep. 1130, 1130 (K.B.) (punishing a 
government agent for wrongly stripping and lashing the plaintiff); Beardmore v. Carrington, 
(1764) 95 Eng. Rep. 790, 793–94 (K.B.) (punishing an illegal search and seizure). 
 45. See Hopkins v. Atl. & Saint Lawrence R.R., 36 N.H. 9, 10–11 (1857) (punishing a 
railroad’s negligent care of trains); Varillat v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 10 La. Ann. 88, 
88–89 (1855) (punishing a negligent railroad employee). 
 46. The judge’s rationale in Huckle v. Money resonates this tone: 
[T]he personal injury done to him was very small, so that if the jury had been 
confined by their oath to consider the mere personal injury only, perhaps 20l. 
damages would have been thought damages sufficient; but the small injury done to 
the plaintiff, or the inconsiderableness of his station and rank in life did not appear to 
the jury in that striking light in which the great point of law touching the liberty of the 
subject appeared to them at the trial; they saw a magistrate over all the King’s 
03__CHAPMAN.DOC 3/9/2007  7:48 AM 
2007] PUNITIVE DAMAGES 1127 
B. American Colonial Developments 
In each American colony, almost from inception, the jury 
emerged as a significant local and popular shield against monarchal 
abuse of the citizenry. One commentator notes that “[t]he right to 
trial by jury was probably the only one universally secured by the first 
American state constitutions.”47 Each colony had a unique system of 
justice, and each colony presents distinct stories of heroic and 
rebellious juries. 
In Massachusetts, for example, juries enjoyed a broad scope of 
authority. The jury was an important part of a legal regime dedicated 
to infusing the law with community morality over issues ranging from 
creditor-debtor relations to Sabbath breaking.48 The greatest 
indication of the jury’s power is that “whereas modern juries must 
follow the law as stated to them by the court, juries in pre-
revolutionary Massachusetts could ignore judges’ instructions on the 
law and decide the law by themselves in both civil and criminal 
cases.”49 William E. Nelson attributes the difference between the 
jury’s power in Massachusetts and in most other common law systems 
to Massachusetts’s “substantial ethical unity and economic and social 
stability”; as “the unity and stability broke down near the end of the 
turn of the [nineteenth] century, the jury system began to function 
less efficiently and with less certainty and predictability.”50 
Experience in the colonies was not homogenous. Although in 
some colonies, such as Virginia, the jury probably had less power than 
the justice of the peace, in all cases, “historical evidence makes it 
clear not only that people throughout America were preoccupied 
 
subjects, exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna Charta, and attempting to 
destroy the liberty of the kingdom, by insisting upon the legality of this general 
warrant before them; they heard the King’s Counsel, and saw the solicitor of the 
Treasury endeavouring to support and maintain the legality of the warrant in a 
tyrannical and severe manner. These are the ideas which struck the jury on the trial; 
and I think they have done right in giving exemplary damages. 
(1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768–69 (K.B.). 
 47. LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN 
HISTORY: LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 281 (Torchbook 1963) (1960), quoted in Stephan 
Landsman, The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE 
CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 22, 36 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
 48. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF 
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 3–6 (1994). 
 49. Id. at 3. 
 50. Id. at 8. 
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with safeguarding the jury but that they relied on the jury to restrain 
government.”51 
Perhaps most famously, New York hosted the famous trial of 
publisher John Peter Zenger in 1735 for seditious libel. He allegedly 
accused Governor William Cosby “of corruption, misfeasance, and 
usurpation of the right to jury trial.”52 The judge’s instructions gave 
the jury no discretion to decide whether Zenger’s publication was 
legal or illegal. Rather, the judge effectively required a conviction as 
long as the jury found that Zenger in fact published the material.53 
Zenger’s counsel urged the jury to acquit, however, arguing that the 
publication was legal if the published accusations were true.54 The jury 
ignored the judge’s instruction and acquitted Zenger. The case 
exemplifies the function of the colonial jury as a check on an 
unelected judiciary.55 
In addition to the Zenger case, numerous attempts by colonial 
governors to control the courts, often by limiting jury trials, were 
consistently rebuffed in the middle of the eighteenth century. By the 
time of the Revolution, the number of jury trials had actually 
increased in most jurisdictions and jury trials were available in 
admiralty and vice admiralty courts. As Stephan Landsman notes, 
“[i]n the period between the 1760s and the Revolution, the jury 
represented the most effective means available to secure the 
independence and integrity of the judicial branch of the colonial 
government.”56 
Besides the colonial jury experience, the founding generation’s 
words also suggest the jury’s political role as originally intended in the 
Constitution. The Fifth Resolution of the First Continental Congress 
of 1774 demanded the jury as each colony’s political right vis-à-vis the 
Empire: “‘[T]he respective colonies are entitled to . . . the great and 
inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the 
 
 51. Landsman, supra note 47, at 33. 
 52. Landsman, supra note 18, at 593. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. (“The jury verdict acquitting Zenger established that: the press should be free to 
criticize the government, truth should be a defense to libel charges, judges do not necessarily 
have absolute control over questions they designate as ‘legal,’ and colonial juries, like their 
English counterparts, were fully capable of defending fundamental rights.”). 
 56. Id. at 596. 
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vicinage . . . .’”57 The Second Continental Congress’s Declaration of 
the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms,58 echoed this 
sentiment, and denial of the “benefits of trial by jury” was one of the 
grievances against the colonies listed in the Declaration of 
Independence.59 
These grievances highlight both a similarity, and an important 
difference, between the role of the jury in the colonies and its role 
after the War for Independence. The jury continued to perform a 
political function, particularly in relation to a professional and often 
unelected judiciary. But whereas the colonial jury was in many ways 
the only democratic institution available to protect against abuses by 
what was increasingly considered a foreign occupier, Congress was 
chosen to bear the weight of the new popular sovereignty conceived 
by the Framers. The jury was thus no longer necessary to counter-
balance an abusive monarch. Or, more cynically, the same jury that 
was useful for rebels might be threatening to new governors. Even so, 
Professor Akhil Amar sums up the jury’s identity after American 
Independence: “Juries were, in a sense, the people themselves, tried-
and-true embodiments of late-eighteenth-century republican 
ideology.”60 Even though the jury’s political role necessarily evolved 
in the popular sovereignty, it did not vanish. 
C. The Jury’s Experience in the United States 
Professor Stephan Landsman plots three eras of the jury in the 
American republic. In the first era (1776–1840), the jury, consistent 
with its identity as an element of the judiciary, stabilized partisan 
divisions.61 Although the Federalists and Republicans bickered about 
the role of the jury, in most cases a compromise was reached that 
reasserted the strength of the jury: the Massachusetts legislature 
 
 57. Id. (quoting DECLARATION AND RESOLVES OF THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 
(1774), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL 
LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 272, 278 (Richard L. 
Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1952)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Landsman, supra note 47, at 36. 
 60. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 234 (2005). 
 61. See Landsman, supra note 47, at 39–43 (“[The jury] became an instrument of 
compromise that tempered both the ardent Federalist desire for a strong judiciary and the 
Republican radicals’ thirst for a simplified law without courtrooms or lawyers.”). 
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preserved the jury’s right to decide issues of law,62 Judge Addison of 
Pennsylvania was impeached for interfering with the jury,63 and 
Justice Samuel Chase was prosecuted (but eventually acquitted) for 
“invad[ing] the province of the jury” by removing certain issues from 
its consideration.64 The populace specifically likened Chase to the 
overreaching judges in the Zenger and Seven Bishops cases;65 such 
zeal endorsed Alexis de Tocqueville’s view that the jury was a 
repository of power in the governed.66 
In the second jury era (1840–1900), the jury’s political role was 
limited for the sake of industrial development.67 The introduction of 
the doctrine of contributory negligence allowed judges to scrutinize 
plaintiff behavior and prevent many issues from ever reaching the 
jury, who, unlike judges, was presumed unable to steel itself against 
compassion for the “feeble, and apparently oppressed” individual 
victims of industrial (particularly railroad) enterprises.68 In short, it 
was assumed that the jury was “incapable of comprehending the new 
industrial reality”69 and would have qualms with the necessity of 
breaking some proverbial eggs to make the omelet of an advanced 
society. The use of contributory negligence to shut juries out of the 
legal decision-making process may not have been universal, but 
probably accelerated the jury’s deterioration beginning in the early 
1900s. 
The third jury era observed by Landsman encompasses the 
twentieth century, in which scholars focused on the jury’s efficiency, 
first rhetorically, then with social science studies. Charles E. Clark 
submitted early realist theories of jury inefficiency to limited 
empirical study in the 1930s and concluded that the twelve-person, 
unanimous jury and the procedures attendant wasted judicial time 
 
 62. See id. at 41 (“Massachusetts moderates . . . insist[ed] that juries retain the sort of 
powers they had previously held.”). 
 63. Id. at 40. 
 64. Id. at 42–43. 
 65. Id. at 42. 
 66. Id. at 43 (“In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville concludes that the 
American jury of the 1830s was a fundamentally ‘political institution,’ whose primary function 
was to place political power in the hands of the governed.”). 
 67. See id. at 43–47 (“Many of the new tort rules [introduced in the nineteenth century] 
have been said to reflect the perceptions of the judges—who frequently saw the needs of the 
industrialists as paramount—rather than more liberal and humanistic views.”). 
 68. Id. at 45–46 (quoting Haring v. N.Y. & Erie R.R., 13 Barb. 2, 15–16 (N.Y. Gen Term 
1852)). 
 69. Id. at 44. 
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and resources, “‘whatever the political, psychological or 
jurisprudential values of the jury.’”70 Support for his findings faltered, 
and they were put to rest definitively by Hans Zeisel and Harry 
Kalven’s University of Chicago Jury Project, which began in the 
1950s.71 The Project asserted that the difference in time between 
bench and jury trials could be substantially mitigated by “a series of 
case and trial management techniques.”72 Also, Zeisel and Kalven’s 
conclusion that judges and juries usually agree have been reconfirmed 
recently in the context of punitive damages: studies suggest that 
judges and juries do not “differ in the rate at which they award 
punitive damages, or in the central relation between the size of 
punitive awards and compensatory awards.”73 Ultimately, unlike 
Clark, Zeisel and Kalven factored into their inquiry the political and 
normative role of the jury, and their findings were met with general 
approval. 
The twentieth century has also seen the jury’s role in the civil 
context limited by the advent of a number of trial procedures and 
institutional developments. For the sake of efficiency, predictability, 
or institutional control, issues are regularly kept from the jury.74 For 
instance, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the 
judge to forgo jury review of the case with a summary judgment 
ruling,75 and Rule 50(b) allows the judge to overrule the jury 
notwithstanding the verdict.76 These measures may be viewed as the 
fruit of jury mistrust. More positively, though, they represent an 
attempt to hone the adversarial system and ensure that “[t]he jury is 
the most neutral and passive decisionmaker available.”77 
 
 70. Charles E. Clark & Harry Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases—A Study in Judicial 
Administration, 43 YALE L.J. 867, 884 (1934) (emphasis added). 
 71. See Landsman, supra note 47, at 50–51 (“Zeisel and his colleagues found that, while 
jury trials are approximately 40 percent longer than bench trials, the cost of the jury system is 
more than justified by the values it introduces into the trial process.”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study i 
(Nov. 1, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=248419 (last visited Jan. 28, 2007). 
 74. See generally ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 243–349 (2001) 
(discussing mechanisms that curtail the modern jury’s power and involvement in dispute 
resolution). 
 75. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 76. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). 
 77. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 288 
(1999). 
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Numerous categories of legal disputes now evade the jury in 
favor of an administrative agency78 or an arbitral tribunal. But the 
degree to which either of these represents a restriction on the jury is 
unclear. Administrative adjudications are usually completed by an 
administrative official without a jury, but they are not entirely out of 
the judiciary’s province because they are usually reviewed for 
constitutionality by an Article III court. So in administrative 
adjudications, the jury’s political clout is diminished vis-à-vis the 
power of the federal judiciary. But there is a caveat: many 
administrative proceedings either would not exist without an 
administrative mechanism, or would not require a jury trial in the 
absence of agency oversight. As to arbitrations, private parties who 
choose to forgo a jury trial by opting for arbitration may not have 
reached an agreement in the first place without stipulating to an 
arbitration clause. So, although the rise of alternative dispute 
resolution and agency adjudication has displaced the jury somewhat, 
not every case that lands in one of those arenas would have been a 
controversy but for those arenas’ existence. 
Even though the American jury’s political role was barely 
discernable in the Frankish inquisito, it emerged from English history 
to its full height in Massachusetts and other colonies, and then 
necessarily evolved into an integral part of the American republic. 
Although the jury’s influence has been mitigated and threatened over 
the century, its constitutional role has blossomed in many ways over 
the last fifty years. 
II.  THE CONSTITUTION AND THE JURY 
The jury’s current political role as a democratic and local check 
on federal judges, although not evident from the text of the 
Constitution, is exhibited by the structure of the powers created by 
the Constitution. As current constitutional doctrine across a number 
of fields suggests, the jury’s clearest political responsibility is to inject 
community morality into the application of the law. 
A. History and Text of the Seventh Amendment 
The Constitution, as signed by the Continental Congress on 
September 17, 1787, said little about juries. It never could have been 
 
 78. See SWARD, supra note 74, at 207. Approximately 340,000 cases per year are 
adjudicated administratively. Id. 
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ratified, however, without amendments safeguarding the common law 
right to jury trial. These amendments represented a compromise 
between the Federalists and Antifederalists. Federalist leader 
Alexander Hamilton noted that all the Framers agreed on “the value 
they set upon the trial by jury.”79 What distinguished the parties’ 
positions was that the Federalists believed there is no “inseparable 
connection between the existence of liberty and the trial by jury in 
civil cases,”80 but that Congress, as the people’s voice, would 
guarantee the jury’s longevity.81 
The Antifederalists, however, opposed the Constitution if an 
amendment securing civil juries was not added, often echoing the 
language of Blackstone: 
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our 
persons and our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if 
that be entirely entrusted to the magistracy, a select body of men, 
and those generally selected by the prince or such as enjoy the 
highest offices in the state, their decisions, in spite of their own 
natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias towards 
those of their own rank and dignity; it is not to be expected from 
human nature that the few should be always attentive to the interests 
and good of the many.82 
On this issue, the nation sided with the Antifederalists. The Bill 
of Rights guaranteed numerous individual rights designed to 
maximize not only freedom from state coercion, but public 
participation in the new republican government. And, “[t]he jury 
summed up—indeed embodied—the ideals of populism, federalism, 
and civic virtue that were the essence of the original Bill of Rights.”83 
Specifically, the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury 
trial in most cases, and the Judiciary Act of 1789, which Congress 
considered simultaneous with the Seventh Amendment, narrowly 
circumscribes the scope of equity at trial, thus necessarily broadening 
the scope of jury issues.84 
 
 79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 562 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1977). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Landsman, supra note 18, at 599. 
 82. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *350, *379. 
 83. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1190 
(1991). 
 84. Landsman, supra note 18, at 600. 
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The text of the Seventh Amendment addresses those ratifiers 
concerned that their rights at common law might be abrogated: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no 
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of 
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.85 
It mentions the common law twice explicitly, and “preserve[s]” the 
right of trial by jury. Although this adumbration does not clarify 
whether new kinds of cases require a jury trial,86 at a minimum, the 
Seventh Amendment does not abrogate the pre-Independence right 
to a jury trial in civil cases. 
But what does the Seventh Amendment, which preserves the 
right of civil litigants to trial by a civil jury, have to do with the jury’s 
political role vis-à-vis the political branches? Professors Akhil Amar 
and Allan Hirsch argue that all voters have an implied Seventh 
Amendment right to participate in a jury. To them, jury service is 
inextricably linked to self-determination.87 This argument is attractive, 
particularly considered in light of de Tocqueville’s assertion that the 
jury provides an important tool of educating lay people in the laws 
and administration of justice in order to educate them for self-rule.88 
The assertion of Professors Amar and Hirsch, even if untenable as a 
constitutional argument, is a welcome caution against the American 
jury’s slow demise. It is not necessary, however, for one to believe in 
an individual right to serve on a jury to view the jury as having a 
constitutional role to play as a democratic counterbalance to the 
professional judiciary. 
B. Structure of the Constitution: the Jury as a Local and  
Democratic Counterbalance 
Within the constitutional structure, the jury provides a local and 
democratic counterbalance to the federal judiciary. This 
counterbalance is derived both from the Constitution’s text, as well as 
 
 85. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 86. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564–65 (1990) 
(“The right to a jury trial includes more than the common-law forms of action recognized in 
1791 . . . . The right extends to causes of action created by Congress.”). 
 87. AKHIL AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE 59–60 (1998). 
 88. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 285 (Phillips Bradley ed., 
Alfred A. Knopf 1946) (1830) (calling the jury a “gratuitous public school”). 
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a combination of the text and the architecture of the federal union. In 
both cases, the jury operates as a subunit of the federal judiciary and 
counterbalances it as a democratic and local institution. 
Read in light of the Bill of Rights, Article III implies that the 
civil jury, as a subunit of the federal courts, is a democratic 
counterbalance to judges. Article III vests “[t]he judicial Power of the 
United States . . . in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts 
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”89 This 
same “Judicial power” does not extend to certain suits in law and 
equity, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.90 Presumably, then, 
this judicial power does extend to those suits at common law for 
which the Seventh Amendment preserves the right of trial by jury,91 
and Article III itself provides that the “Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be 
by Jury.”92 This interpretation of the judicial power provides 
symmetry to the Constitution’s democratic vision: the people 
themselves, through juries, apply their own laws enacted through 
Congress and the President. 
This symmetry is buttressed by the political structure suggested 
by the Constitution. Professor Charles Black has noted that, in light 
of the “high generality and consequent ambiguity which marks so 
many crucial constitutional texts,”93 “the logic of national structure”94 
often provides a legitimate and practical constitutional reference.95 
The question is whether the civil jury has a political relationship to 
the professional judiciary because of the practical structure of the 
federal government, either between the national branches or between 
the national government and state government. The Constitution, 
even if it does not vest part of the judicial power in juries, certainly 
preserves their function within the federal judiciary. Anything a jury 
does could be done by a judge—insofar as the Constitution preserves 
its function, it preserves it at the expense of a judge’s power. As 
 
 89. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 90. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 91. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 93. CHARLES L. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 30 
(1969). 
 94. Id. at 11. 
 95. Id. at 23. 
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Professor Landsman notes, the civil jury “had become the democratic 
counterbalance to an unelected judiciary.”96 
Additionally, as “a quintessential government body . . . [that] 
exercis[es] the power of the court and of the government that confers 
the court’s jurisdiction,”97 the jury’s democratic attributes have grown 
in the last half of the twentieth century. That is, the jury—and 
therefore the court and government of which the jury is a subset—is 
more representative than ever. Although the Supreme Court had held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents restricting the jury pool to 
whites by 187998 and men by 1975,99 jury composition did not actually 
change much until 1986 in Batson v. Kentucky,100 when the Court 
ruled that a prosecutor must give a race-neutral reason for excluding 
specific jurors when the defendant makes out a prima facie case of 
discrimination.101 The Court extended this holding to civil litigants in 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.102 and criminal defendants in 
Georgia v. McCollum.103 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.104 gave the 
same right to civil defendants where jurors were excluded because of 
gender.105 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company explained why the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects potential civil jurors from 
discrimination: (1) the Fourteenth Amendment generally prohibits 
government discrimination based on race or gender;106 (2) the 
selection of a jury is always state action because the government, via 
the judge and officers of the court, participates in the selection and 
 
 96. Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 873, 877 
(2002). 
 97. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991). Also, “the jury system 
performs the critical governmental functions of guarding the rights of litigants and ‘ensuring 
continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people.’” Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 
400, 407 (1991)). 
 98. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880). Strauder confirmed the 
constitutional permissibility of the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which prohibited 
excluding jurors based on their race. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2000). 
 99. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535–36 (1975). 
 100. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 101. Id. at 84. 
 102. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616. 
 103. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50 (1992). 
 104. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 105. Id. at 129. 
 106. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618 (“[A] prosecutor’s race-based peremptory challenge 
violates the equal protection rights of those excluded from jury service.”). 
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because the product, the jury, is a state actor;107 and (3) because jury 
selection is state action, “courts must entertain a challenge to a 
private litigant’s racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges 
in a civil trial.”108 The Court had already explained in Powers v. 
Ohio109 that generally “[a]n individual juror does not have a right to 
sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right not 
to be excluded from one on account of race.”110 The Court thus shifted 
the emphasis from the right of the parties to an impartial jury to the 
goals of democracy: “Jury service is an exercise of responsible 
citizenship by all members of the community.”111 
Jury advocates urge that Colgrove v. Battin,112 which held that the 
Seventh Amendment does not require a twelve-person jury,113 
reduced the jury’s democratic attributes by reducing the odds that a 
given jury will reflect the diversity of a community. Perhaps this is so, 
but by the same logic, a twelve-person jury is less democratic than a 
twenty-person jury or a 300-person jury. Lowering the number of 
jurors on a jury certainly reduces the breadth of representation on 
that jury, but it does not change the jury’s democratic nature. The 
finite size of a jury, the random selection of each jury pool, and the 
challenge and dismissal of potential jurors all work together to define 
and limit the democratic attributes of the jury. Consistent with the 
representative model for the other branches of government, a jury is a 
republican institution, although composed of unelected and to some 
degree misrepresentative lay people. 
All of this is to say that a jury is now, on the whole, more 
representative of its given community than ever. Judge Calabresi and 
Professor Philip Bobbit argue that as a representative, one-time 
player in the legal system, the jury is uniquely situated to make 
“tragic choices,” particularly difficult judgments, without risking 
either prejudice or political backlash. As they observe, “Juries apply 
societal standards without ever telling society what these standards 
 
 107. Id. at 627 (“The selection of jurors represents a unique governmental function 
delegated to private litigants by the government and attributable to the government for 
purposes of invoking constitutional protections against discrimination by reason of race.”). 
 108. Id. at 630. 
 109. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
 110. Id. at 409. 
 111. Id. at 402. 
 112. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973). Now, federal juries may be composed of six to 
twelve people. FED. R. CIV. P. 48. 
 113. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 160. 
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are, or even that they exist. This is especially important in those 
situations in which the statement of standards would be terribly 
destructive.”114 
As John Hart Ely notes, however, the jury is not a substitute for 
the legislature as a representative institution.115 Accordingly, a jury 
can and should only apply punitive damages consistent with 
legislation. Even more, each jury judgment should be reviewed for 
the taint of prejudice. Although a jury’s purpose or intent may be 
even more inscrutable than a legislature’s, a reviewing judge should 
presume that a jury did not act with prejudice when a defendant has 
access to the political process. Wealthy corporate defendants provide 
an interesting case that will not be analyzed fully here. Suffice it to 
say, although corporations may not be represented on a jury by a 
director or executive, many jurors have a stake in one or more large 
public corporations, and corporations as a class arguably have more 
influence on the political process than any other interest group 
(including racial minorities, Ely’s primary concern).116 
In addition to its role as a democratic voice within the judiciary, 
the jury also plays an important role in the constitutional structure of 
federalism as a local actor vis-à-vis a national judiciary. A jury may 
assign punitive damages, either as a state or federal judicial actor. As 
a state judicial actor, its democratic role may be less important insofar 
as the trial judge may be directly elected by a local constituency. 
Nevertheless, a federal court reviewing a jury’s determination of 
punitive damages for constitutionality is presented with the ad hoc 
judgment of a group of locals. Because the Tenth Amendment 
arguably reserves the right to punish civil wrongs to the states, there 
is no serious objection to the argument that states may 
constitutionally choose to cap or abolish punitive damages. Pursuant 
to that constitutional right, most states, even after the tort reform 
movement, continue to vest local groups of citizens with the power to 
punish civil wrongdoing. So, although the Constitution is the supreme 
 
 114. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 17–19, 57–64, 186–89 (1978) 
(footnote omitted). 
 115. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
174–77 (1980) (noting the role of statutory restrictions on juror decision-making in capital cases, 
and concluding that “[i]t is by reducing, hardly by increasing, the discretion of juries . . . that we 
move to protect those who are not so insulated from the sort of ‘unusual’ enforcement regime it 
is the point of the Eighth Amendment to preclude”). 
 116. Id. at 7–8. 
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law of the land,117 and the Fourteenth Amendment limits punitive 
damages awards,118 this limit should balance rather than ignore the 
structure of the federal union. Some deference, at least, should be 
given by federal judges to local juries in the interest of federalism. 
Further, although a state may legislatively limit the jury’s 
punitive damages award discretion, the limits of such legislation—
particularly on the heels of the tort reform movement—should give 
rise to the assumption that the people of the state have 
democratically chosen to empower the jury to punish wrongdoing up 
to those limits.119 This decision should likewise find a place in the 
federalism equation. 
The jury is neither the equal of the legislature as a representative 
institution nor the equal of the judiciary as a legal decision maker. 
But both of those other groups collaborate with the jury to govern 
this nation. Legislatures and judges, over decades, craft laws and rules 
of procedure and evidence with the intention that a set of local, 
impartial citizens will, given a carefully drawn set of facts and law, 
remain impartial and enforce the community’s sensibility in a given 
case. That sensibility may run counter to a state’s majority or 
constitutional principles. The appropriate remedy in the first instance 
is either remittitur by the trial judge (who may be directly elected) or 
state legislative action. The appropriate remedy in the second 
instance is federal judicial review, but because of the jury’s political 
role as a democratic and local check to the federal judiciary, the 
review should constitute a glance back at the jury’s original view, not 
a carte blanche revision by an unelected national official. 
C. The Jury’s Constitutional Specialty: Morality 
Recent Supreme Court doctrine suggests that the jury best fulfils 
its role vis-à-vis the professional judge when it provides community 
moral standards for tough constitutional questions calling for ad hoc 
judgment. The jury adds such community morality to constitutional 
law in at least two circumstances: when determining whether a death 
 
 117. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
 118. See infra Part IV. 
 119. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: 
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 634–35 (5th ed. 2004) (providing a catalogue of which states limit 
punitive damages and how they do so). 
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sentence is justified, and in determining whether material is obscene, 
and so not protected by the First Amendment.120 
First, the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona held that the jury, 
not the judge, must determine specific aggravating factors in the case 
of murder that warrant a death sentence.121 This extended the Court’s 
holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey122 that “any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”123 
The Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause demand that the jury, 
not the judge, determine that all elements of a crime that bear on the 
appropriate level of punishment are proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.124 Whether a particular factor justifies a sentence of death is a 
uniquely moral judgment.125 By requiring the jury to make that 
judgment, the Court has in part democratized a difficult policy and 
constitutional issue.126 
Additionally, since Miller v. California,127 the jury applies 
community standards to determine whether material is obscene, and 
therefore not protected by the First Amendment. The Court in Miller 
 
 120. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that a jury must find the 
aggravating factors that warrant a death sentence); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33–34 
(1973) (deciding that the jury determines whether a material’s dominant theme appeals to a 
prurient interest and violates community standards of decency, and so amounts to unprotected 
obscenity under the First Amendment). 
 121. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. 
 122. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 123. Id. at 490. 
 124. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (“The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a 
defendant’s sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death.”). 
 125. Scott Sundby, The Death Penalty’s Future, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1959–60 (2006) (citing 
data that suggest most capital case jurors are trying “to restore the moral imbalance created by 
the murder” when reaching a sentencing decision); Scott Sundby, Moral Accuracy and 
“Wobble” in Capital Sentencing, 80 IND. L.J. 56, 59 (2005) (suggesting that a jury’s sentencing 
decision in capital cases “is inescapably a moral one”). 
 126. See James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital 
Punishment, 1963–2006, 107 COLUM L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2007) (“The Court almost [solved this 
problem] by blending both Coverian solutions—excused detachment and justified 
deployment—into an ingenious system for sharing constitutional decisionmaking with capital 
sentencing juries, state appellate courts, and state legislatures. To achieve its objective, however, 
the Court needed to exercise residual responsibility for assuring the integrity of hundreds of 
local proportionality decisions while using the aggregate results of these democratic decisions to 
inform its own constitutional judgment.”). 
 127. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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held that the jury should apply three guidelines to determine whether 
a law runs afoul of the First Amendment: 
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to 
the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.128 
The jury is explicitly told to apply “contemporary community 
standards” in determining whether material, as a matter of law, is 
protected by the First Amendment. This is the most overt expression 
of the Court’s reliance on the jury to inject morality into 
constitutional law.129 
The Court has not shied away from putting tough questions of 
morality on the jury’s shoulders. The reprehensibility of a civil 
defendant’s behavior is like the factors that warrant the death 
penalty. In both cases the jury, after assessing liability or guilt, 
considers the defendant’s behavior holistically in light of the 
defendant’s history and the facts of the instant wrongdoing. Although 
criminal procedure, and particularly the requirement of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, further protects criminal defendants, the analogy 
is not inapposite because punitive damages are neither as shameful 
nor destructive as criminal punishment. Civil defendants are not 
stripped of political rights such as voting, do not carry a civil 
judgment on their record for life, and are rarely “killed” or 
completely destroyed by punitive damages. And the determination of 
punitive damages calls the jury to make a unique community-based 
judgment of reprehensibility like the determination of prurience, one 
that might change over time and draw on local community norms. At 
a minimum, in light of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the 
jury’s role in applying community standards of morality, the jury 
should be given more deference in its assessment of civil punishment. 
 
 128. Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 
(1972) (per curiam)). 
 129. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (“The fact that distributors of allegedly 
obscene materials may be subjected to varying community standards in the various federal 
judicial districts . . . does not render a federal statute unconstitutional because of the failure of 
application of uniform national standards of obscenity.”). 
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III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The Constitution’s text provides little guidance regarding the 
propriety of any given punitive damages award. Historically, a jury’s 
decision was not overturned unless it was arbitrary or based on 
prejudice. Recently, however, the due process requirements for 
punitive damages awards have stiffened, at the expense of the jury’s 
political power. 
An award is constitutionally valid if it is not grossly excessive or 
arbitrary in light of the behavior it punishes—or conversely, if it is 
reasonably proportionate to the demerit of that behavior.130 If a 
punitive damages award is disproportionate, the defendant is 
deprived of due process because it was impossible for her have 
adequate notice of the legal ramifications of her behavior.131 But this 
substantive limit provides no real restriction because—at least in 
theory—any award could be justified depending on the 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s behavior. So the substantive rule 
has no bite until it is joined with the Court’s recent procedural 
limitation: a jury’s determination of the reprehensibility of a 
defendant’s behavior garners zero deference on appellate review.132 
Together the rules provide strong medicine against jury overreaching 
on punitive damages. The Court’s concern is the fairness of arbitrarily 
exorbitant punishments,133 but its remedy may be too strong when it 
merely substitutes its own moral judgment for the jury’s. 
A. The Constitution’s Text 
The Constitution does not guarantee a right to punitive damages, 
nor does it prohibit their imposition. The Court has recognized their 
 
 130. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (“To the extent an 
award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose and constitutes an arbitrary 
deprivation of property.”). 
 131. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (“Elementary notions of fairness 
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of 
the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a 
State may impose.”). 
 132. See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 436 (“[C]ourts of appeals 
should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district courts’ determinations of the 
constitutionality of punitive damage awards.”). 
 133. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“This constitutional concern, itself 
harkening back to the Magna Carta, arises out of the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of 
life, liberty, or property, through the application, not of law and legal processes, but of arbitrary 
coercion.”). 
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permissibility since 1851, in Day v. Woodworth.134 Moreover, the 
Court has consistently held, both before and after the advent of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,135 that the jury’s traditional role at common 
law in awarding punitive damages is constitutional.136 Although they 
are permitted under the Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment 
limits punitive damages, and few question a state’s power to cap or 
even abolish them.137 
A punitive damages award is, of course, punishment. As a 
punishment imposed for civil misbehavior, it straddles criminal and 
civil law, because the state typically has a monopoly on punitive 
power. Although the Constitution does not directly address punitive 
damages per se, the Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits excessive 
fines and “cruel and unusual punishments.”138 But the Supreme Court 
has held—in spite of occasional language to the contrary139—that the 
Eighth Amendment does not limit punitive damages. In Ingraham v. 
Wright,140 the Court determined that the Eighth Amendment does not 
limit noncriminal punishments,141 and, in Browning-Ferris v. Kelko 
Disposal, Inc.,142 it held that the Excessive Fines Clause of that 
amendment does not limit awards in cases between private parties.143 
 
 134. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (noting that “exemplary, 
punitive, or vindictive damages” are well-established at common law). 
 135. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) (“For nothing is better settled than that, in 
such cases as the present, and other actions for torts where no precise rule of law fixes the 
recoverable damages, it is the peculiar function of the jury to determine the amount by their 
verdict.”); Woodworth, 54 U.S. at 371 (noting, before the Fourteenth Amendment, that “[t]his 
has been always left to the discretion of the jury, as the degree of punishment to be thus 
inflicted must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case”); see also Minneapolis & St. 
Louis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 36 (1889) (“The imposition of punitive or exemplary 
damages . . . cannot . . . be justly assailed as infringing upon the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). 
 136. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991). 
 137. See SWARD, supra note 74, at 303 n.197 (citing various works that note the lack of 
constitutional problems with states limiting punitive damages). 
 138. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 139. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 77 (1988) (stating that an 
appellant’s challenge to the size of a punitive award “raises a cognizable constitutional challenge 
to the size of the award, one based on the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment,” 
despite declining to rule on the appellant’s challenge); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 
813, 828–29 (1986) (noting that whether a large “punitive damages award is impermissible under 
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eight Amendment” is an “important issue[] . . . [that] must be 
resolved”). 
 140. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
 141. Id. at 667–68. 
 142. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelko Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
 143. Id. at 275. 
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Instead, the Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence is grounded 
in the Fourteenth Amendment, which prevents a state from 
“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”144 This clause prohibits courts145 from depriving any 
person of “property,” including both finances and reputation,146 by 
awarding punitive damages without “due process.” The question, 
then, is, “What is due process?” 
B. The Due Process Requirement of Notice 
Historically, the Court struck down a punitive damages award 
only if it was “excessive.”147 A jury award was upheld unless it was 
“the product of bias or passion, or if it was reached in proceedings 
lacking the basic elements of fundamental fairness.”148 Until 1994, 
only one award was held to be excessive: the award was “plainly 
arbitrary and oppressive” because “there was no intentional 
wrongdoing.”149 Then, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,150 the 
Court began adding some muscle and flesh to the skeletal frame of 
the Due Process Clause. 
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, after holding that a 
state may not punish or deter behavior that is lawful in other states,151 
the Court held that an unusually large punitive damages award does 
not comport with the requirement that a defendant be given adequate 
notice of potential punishments for wrongdoing. Gore provides three 
“guideposts” for determining whether a punitive damages award is 
unreasonable: (1) the degree of the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s behavior (the most important of the three guideposts), 
(2) the difference between actual harm and punitive damages, and (3) 
 
 144. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 145. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (expressing the notion that judicial 
decisions are “state action” for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 146. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). 
 147. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (“In most jurisdictions jury 
discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the general rule that they not be 
excessive.”). 
 148. Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 276. 
 149. Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 490–91 (1915). 
 150. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 151. Id. at 572 (“We think it follows from the[] principles of state sovereignty and comity 
that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of 
changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.”). 
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the difference between punitive damages and civil penalties for 
comparable behavior.152 
The Court then demonstrated how to apply the guideposts to 
determine whether the defendant had adequate notice of the 
punishment imposed by the jury. As to reprehensibility, BMW’s 
behavior was found not to be egregious. The Court considered 
various indicia of reprehensibility: the nature of the wrong (violence 
and deceit are particularly serious); the nature of the harm (merely 
economic harm is not so serious); and whether the wrong is 
repetitive.153 All told, BMW’s behavior was not too reprehensible. 
The suppression of a material fact risked, at most, a modest property 
loss.154 As to the ratio of punitive to actual damages, although the 
Court rejected a bright-line rule, it found that a 500 to 1 ratio of 
punitive to actual damages was “breathtaking” given the low 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s behavior.155 And finally, as to 
sanctions for comparable behavior, BMW’s conduct would not have 
been illegal in many states, and—where it was illegal—fines were 
usually limited to under $10,000.156 Therefore, every guidepost 
ultimately pointed toward an excessive punitive damages award. 
The Court’s standard in Gore was predicated partly on a 
skeptical view of the jury’s utility as a source of policy. Justice Breyer, 
concurring, reasoned that 
one cannot expect to direct jurors like legislators through the ballot 
box; nor can one expect those jurors to interpret law like judges, 
who work within a discipline and hierarchical organization that 
normally promotes roughly uniform interpretation and application 
of the law. Yet here Alabama expects jurors to act, at least a little, 
like legislators or judges, for it permits them, to a certain extent, to 
create public policy and to apply that policy, not to compensate a 
victim, but to achieve a policy-related objective outside the confines 
of the particular case.157 
 
 152. Id. at 574–75. 
 153. Id. at 576–80. 
 154. Id. at 579–80. Justice Scalia, of course, disagreed: “Today’s decision . . . is really no 
more than a disagreement with the community’s sense of indignation or outrage expressed in 
the punitive award of the Alabama jury. . . .” Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 155. Id. at 583 (majority opinion). Compare Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which looks, with 
a higher level of abstraction, at the proportionality of the award to the state’s legitimate punitive 
goals. Id. at 596–97 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 156. Id. at 584–85 (majority opinion). 
 157. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Thus, according to Justice Breyer, because juries are unelected 
on the one hand, and composed of lay people on the other, their 
discretion regarding “public policy” should be cabined 
constitutionally. This is not just a recommendation to the state of 
Alabama about the prudence of jury discretion in assigning moral 
blameworthiness to particular acts. Rather, there is a constitutional 
requirement to present the jury with “clear legal principles” or 
“historical or community-based standards,” besides the traditional 
goals of punishment and deterrence.158 But what is the source of those 
“historical or community-based standards” if not the jury itself? 
Justice Scalia disagreed about the importance and utility of a 
jury’s discretion,159 writing that, “[t]oday’s decision . . . is really no 
more than a disagreement with the community’s sense of indignation 
or outrage expressed in the punitive award of the Alabama jury, as 
reduced by the State Supreme Court.”160 He suggested that the 
majority’s decision fails because it takes to task a “judgment about 
the appropriate degree of indignation or outrage, which is hardly an 
analytical determination.”161 The majority would likely counter, 
arguing that legal clarity at least reduces the risk of juror prejudice 
masquerading as community outrage.162 
In State Farm v. Campbell,163 the Court embellished the Gore 
“guideposts.”164 Before embarking on the Gore analysis, the Court 
reiterated its concern about “grossly excessive or arbitrary 
punishments,”165 particularly because defendants in civil cases had 
“not been accorded the protections applicable in a criminal 
proceeding.”166 The Court again asserted that the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct is the most important 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, focused her dissent on the danger 
of federalizing a state subject, particularly where the state court offered adequate review. Id. at 
610, 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. Justice Scalia later notes that one result of the three “guideposts” offered by the 
Court, and the “loophole” where “‘necessary to deter future misconduct,’” is that reviewing 
courts will be forced to “concoct rationalizations” to “justify the intuitive punitive reactions of 
state juries.” Id. at 605 (quoting id. at 584–85 (majority opinion)). 
 162. Justice Scalia would not be so concerned with jury prejudice so long as the jury’s award 
is reasonable. Id. 
 163. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 416 (2003). 
 164. Id. at 418. 
 165. Id. at 416. 
 166. Id. at 417. 
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guidepost.167 Then the Court, relying on principles of federalism, held 
that a jury may not consider “[l]awful out-of-state conduct” when 
determining punishment, although evidence of such conduct “may be 
probative when it demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of 
the defendant’s action in the State where it is tortious.”168 The Court 
hastened to add that punitive damages should be based solely on the 
“conduct that harmed the plaintiff,” not any other dubious policies or 
actions.169 Further, opining on the second Gore guidepost, the Court 
suggested that few punitive damages awards exceeding nine times the 
amount of compensatory damages would pass constitutional muster, 
except perhaps when the act was particularly egregious and the actual 
damages relatively small.170 
Although State Farm’s gloss on Gore likely represented an 
attempt to avoid explicitly raising the level of scrutiny applied to the 
substance of punitive awards, it effectively did just that. Instead of 
risk being overturned for constitutional inadequacy, most lower 
courts would rather decrease a punitive damages award to within nine 
times the amount of actual damages. It is theoretically possible under 
State Farm for punitive damages less than nine times the amount of 
actual damages to still violate due process (perhaps if the 
reprehensibility was very low), or for punitive damages exceeding 
nine times the amount of actual damages to be valid (if the 
reprehensibility is extraordinarily high and the actual damages very 
low). But trial and appeals court judges rarely risk allowing a higher 
award. And it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would nitpick an 
award less than nine times the amount of actual damages. So, unless a 
court is unusually bold, the de facto constitutional rule is that punitive 
damages which exceed nine times the amount of actual damages 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
C. De Novo Review of Punitive Damages Awards 
The biggest blow to the jury’s political role in assigning punitive 
damages came not in Gore or State Farm, however, but rather 
between those two decisions, quietly. In Cooper Industries v. 
Leatherman Tool,171 the Court announced that punitive damages 
 
 167. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. 
 168. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422. 
 169. Id. at 422–23. 
 170. Id. at 425. 
 171. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
03__CHAPMAN.DOC 3/9/2007  7:48 AM 
1148 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:1119 
awards get no deference on appeal, and must be reviewed de novo.172 
The Court justified its decision to erase the judgment of a jury and 
trial court judge regarding the appropriate level of punitive damages 
by analogizing to the de novo standard employed in some criminal 
contexts that require the application of a complex legal doctrine, such 
as “reasonable suspicion” or “probable cause.”173 
Moreover, the Court held that de novo review of punitive 
damages awards does not violate the Seventh Amendment’s 
guarantee of a jury for civil trials because, according to the Court’s 
rationale in Cooper Industries, punitive damages are not issues of 
fact.174 This is a dubious characterization. Whether the award violates 
the Constitution is, of course, a question of law. But latent in the 
Gore analysis is the reprehensibility guidepost, which is, at most, a 
mixed question of law and fact, and may be characterized as a pure 
question of fact. Indeed, that is the very sort of moral 
blameworthiness that juries determine all the time. Appellate courts 
are as competent as trial judges and juries to apply the last two, 
formulaic guideposts.175 But these courts are likely no more 
competent than the combination of jury and trial judge in assessing 
reprehensibility. Moreover, even if they are, it is neither 
constitutionally necessary nor politically desirable for them to make 
such decisions. 
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting from the Cooper decision, noted her 
concern that the new standard comes at a heavy cost with only 
speculative benefits. The new review standard may not yield very 
many different outcomes,176 but it destroys a firmly-embedded 
tradition of jury discretion177 and demands expensive, time-
consuming, and clumsy appellate review of trial court decisions.178 
 
 172. Id. at 436. 
 173. Id.; see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336–37 (1998) (holding that 
courts of appeal should review proportionality determinations de novo); Ornelas v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (holding that trial judges’ determinations of reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal). 
 174. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 437. 
 175. Id. at 440; see Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in the Jurisprudence of 
Juries: Comparing the Capital Sentencing and Punitive Damages Doctrines, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 
1255 (1996) (arguing that legal process theory drives the Court’s reallocation of jury 
responsibilities to other institutions more “competent” or efficient at making punishment 
determinations). 
 176. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 449–50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 177. Id. at 444–45. 
 178. See id. at 450 (“The Court’s approach will be challenging to administer.”). 
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Ginsburg responded to the charge that punitive damages are not 
issues of fact by noting that there is little difference between jury 
discretion to determine noneconomic damages and punitive 
damages.179 Despite institutional competence concerns, she believed 
the district courts are best situated to determine the “most important” 
of the Gore factors, reprehensibility.180 
But why is the jury better situated than appeals courts to 
determine reprehensibility, and why, therefore, should appeals courts 
hesitate to overturn jury awards? Is it because the jury (and usually 
an elected state trial judge) has a better nose for wrongdoing? 
Perhaps: the jury and trial judge do have the benefit of evaluating 
testimony and evidence first-hand. More importantly, though, the 
jury has a more democratic nose for wrongdoing than unelected 
federal appeals judges. Allowing the jury some room to enforce moral 
standards gives play in the joints to federalism, enhances the 
democratic legitimacy of judicial judgment, and gives local 
communities flexibility to respond to novel or particularly pernicious 
forms of wrongdoing that directly affect them. 
IV.  RE-EMPOWERING THE JURY WITHOUT SACRIFICING FAIRNESS 
The Court’s current punitive damages jurisprudence is the 
product of an evolution away from the Court’s historical trust in 
juries to assign punitive damages, and it dramatically limits the power 
of local communities to establish the moral norms that will govern 
both themselves and outside entities that wish to do business with 
them. The Court’s holdings do not need dismantling, merely fine-
tuning. This Part identifies the constitutionally necessary parts of the 
current doctrine and suggests ways to allow the jury greater power to 
affect community norms without sacrificing due process. 
A. The Need for Balance 
The Court’s punitive damages holdings have a great deal of 
merit. They successfully excise two unfair considerations from the 
jury’s purview: the defendant’s similar behavior in other jurisdictions 
which do not prohibit such behavior; and the harm caused to others 
besides the plaintiff, for which the defendant may also be liable. 
Halting the former consideration prevents the punishment of legal 
 
 179. Id. at 446–47. 
 180. Id. at 449. 
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behavior and prevents jurisdiction encroachment, while halting the 
latter consideration prevents multiple punishments for the same 
wrong. Also, in many ways, the Gore guideposts do nothing but flesh 
out the long-standing constitutional rule against excessive or grossly 
arbitrary punitive damages awards. And requiring de novo review of 
the determinations at trial can even be justified on the grounds that 
civil law does not provide the same procedural protections as criminal 
law against unfair punishment. 
The Court did not institute these changes, however, until after a 
rash of large punitive damages awards, and the scholars and special 
interest groups bemoaning them.181 The obvious, although 
unnecessary, conclusion that can be drawn from the Court’s decisions 
is that large awards (perhaps among other factors) undermined the 
Court’s trust in the jury’s decision-making ability. In particular, at 
least some members of the Court were concerned about the political 
authority and competence of the jury to establish appropriate “public 
policy.”182 
The Court overcorrected. De novo review does more than cabin 
jury discretion by preventing certain aspects of the defendant’s 
behavior from factoring into the jury’s determination of 
reprehensibility. It renders juries constitutionally powerless and their 
input meaningless as to the punishment of civil wrongdoing. Juries 
may be relevant so long as the punitive damages award—in 
compliance with State Farm’s firm suggestion—is less than nine times 
the amount of actual damages, but the jury’s determination of 
reprehensibility is effectively expunged any time the defendant 
appeals. Thus the jury’s power vis-à-vis the professional judiciary is 
 
 181. See generally Robert E. Litan, Introduction, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY 
SYSTEM, supra note 47, at 1 (“The American system of civil justice, much admired around the 
world, in recent years has become the subject of great controversy at home.”); see also George 
L. Priest, Introduction: The Problem and Efforts to Understand It, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW 
JURIES DECIDE 1, 1–4 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002) (noting the controversy surrounding 
large punitive damage awards); Jeffrey Robert White, ATLA Protecting Your Rights: The Civil 
Jury: 200 Years Under Siege, ALTA.ORG, http://www.atlanet.org/pressroom/sreports/t006whi. 
aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2007) (relating the importance of the right to a jury trial in civil cases 
and countering critics who claim that civil juries are out of control). 
 182. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore 517 U.S. 559, 596 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[O]ne 
cannot expect to direct jurors like legislators through the ballot box; nor can one expect those 
jurors to interpret law like judges, who work within a discipline and hierarchical organization 
that normally promotes roughly uniform interpretation and application of the law. Yet here 
Alabama expects jurors to act, at least a little, like legislators or judges, for it permits them, to a 
certain extent, to create public policy and to apply that policy, not to compensate a victim, but 
to achieve a policy-related objective outside the confines of the particular case.”). 
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extinguished exactly where the jury is most competent and has played 
the biggest political role historically: in the enforcement of 
community moral norms. Perhaps the Court assumed that large jury 
awards are driven by incompetence or prejudice, rather than 
assuming that the system of checks and balances was working as it 
always had. 
Assuming contemporary juries are functioning normally, and not 
prejudicially (for instance, there was no evidence of prejudice in the 
Gore or State Farm cases), recent large punitive damages awards may 
symbolize late twentieth-century community indignation over 
particular types of wrongdoing more than they indicate a trend of 
arbitrary judgment. Studies demonstrate that large “blockbuster” 
awards happen relatively infrequently, and almost exclusively when 
an individual has been injured by the extremely reckless or 
intentional wrongdoing of a large corporation—usually a tobacco or 
oil company.183 Most important for vindicating jury judgment is the 
finding that juries and judges tend to “award punitive damages in 
approximately the same ratio to compensatory damages”184 and that 
blockbuster punitive awards strongly relate to compensatory 
damages.185 In spite of the current empirical studies battle over the 
effectiveness of the jury,186 the strongest that can be said is that “[d]ata 
reveal a more nuanced and complex picture of judge and jury 
behavior than does conventional wisdom, which typically rests 
precariously on unstudied assumptions and axioms.”187 But it is 
reasonable to conclude that, particularly when balanced against the 
jury’s constitutional and historical role, the empirical arguments that 
the jury’s role in assessing punitive damages should be strictly 
monitored are unpersuasive. That is, even on the empiricist’s terms, 
the jury is more a barometer of community morality than a gauge of 
 
 183. Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Significant Association Between Punitive 
and Compensatory Damages in Blockbuster Cases: A Methodological Primer, 3 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 175 (2006). 
 184. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses 
Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 263, 293 (2006). 
 185. Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 183, at 176. 
 186. For exemplary artifacts of this war, see generally PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES 
DECIDE, supra note 181, and Neil Vidmar, Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform: 
Avoidance, Error, and Overreaching in Sunstein et al.’s Punitive Damages, 53 EMORY L.J. 1359 
(2004). For a list of recent publications dealing with the jury, see Eisenberg et al., supra note 
184, at 266 n.8. 
 187. Eisenberg et al., supra note 184, at 265. 
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community irrationality. But with de novo review of jury decisions, 
that barometer is useless. 
B. Alternative Punitive Damages Doctrines 
This Section suggests and analyzes the constitutional costs and 
benefits of three possible resolutions of the present predicament: (1) 
appellate review of jury awards for abuse of discretion under the 
Gore guideposts, (2) appellate review of jury awards under the prior 
doctrine of excessiveness or arbitrariness, and (3) a hybrid solution 
allowing the jury to apply the Gore guideposts. 
1. Some Deference to Juries, Plus Gore Guidepost Protection of 
Due Process.  Probably the simplest solution would be to dispense 
with the de novo standard of review of jury decisions, and to review 
them instead for abuse of discretion. Appeals courts could still use the 
Gore guideposts as exactly that: guideposts for determining whether 
the defendant was deprived of due process. But rather than simply 
substitute their judgment regarding the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s behavior, courts would give deference to the jury’s 
assessment. The downside to maintaining the guideposts and still 
giving the jury some deference is that it may allow for an 
unconstitutional amount of play in the joints of the Gore guideposts. 
State Farm, although not providing a bright line rule for the ratio 
requirement, cleared the haze substantially. But appeals courts may 
take wildly different approaches in trying to balance deference to the 
jury and application of the guideposts. Although this may affect the 
uniformity of awards, it preserves the jury’s political role, and so long 
as courts generally adhere to the ratio requirement of State Farm, it 
provides adequate due process. 
2. Return to the Prior Rule, With Important Modifications.  The 
Court could return to the prior rule and require review of jury awards 
only for excessiveness or clear arbitrariness. Almost by definition, the 
prior rule comports with the understanding of the jury’s political and 
legal role that has predominated in American history. Unlike the 
Court’s current approach to punitive damages, it recognizes that the 
jury can play an important role in defining public policy in certain 
areas—particularly when assessing the relative blameworthiness of a 
defendant’s actions. The Court could still allow jury consideration of 
wrongs committed outside the jurisdiction. And this rule would not 
be affected by the Court’s answer to one of the questions presented 
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by the current Philip Morris case: whether the defendant can be 
assessed punitive damages for wrongs done against others within the 
same jurisdiction as the plaintiff.188 Whether the jury award is clearly 
arbitrary is essentially a rational basis review. And ever since Romer 
v. Evans,189 animus is not a constitutionally sufficient reason for state 
action, so this rule would not only police excessiveness, but prejudice 
as well.190 
The greatest strength of this rule, with the appropriate 
limitations, is that it does not fetter the jury—it allows the 
community’s moral opprobrium to be realized unless it is based on 
animus, or if it results in excessiveness. This last caveat is the rule’s 
greatest weakness, however: it gives inadequate guidance to courts 
and juries about the definition of excessiveness, and so it risks 
unconstitutional deprivations of property and untold amounts of time 
and money tying up the judicial system with appeals. 
3. Hybrid Solution: Jury Application of the Gore Guideposts.  A 
third option, combining the strengths and eliminating the weaknesses 
of both of the other approaches, is to allow the jury to apply the Gore 
guideposts directly. This approach would simply put the Gore 
guideposts, including the appropriate indicia of reprehensibility, in 
the jury punitive damages instructions. This sort of constitutional 
judgment is not foreign to the modern jury. In fact, the Court employs 
it most often when it wishes to outsource hazy moral judgments, like 
whether material is obscene for purposes of the First Amendment,191 
or in determining facts that could justify the death penalty.192 
Allowing the jury to apply the Gore guideposts would be most 
similar to requiring the jury to apply a three-part test to determine 
whether material is obscene according to community standards. In 
 
 188. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1171 (Or. 2006), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 
2329 (U.S. May 30, 2006) (No. 05-1256). 
 189. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
 190. Id. at 635 (“Amendment 2 is [not] directed to any factual context from which we could 
discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for 
its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.”). 
 191. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33–34 (1973) (discussing the average person 
standard). 
 192. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (“The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary 
to increase a defendant’s sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to 
death.”). 
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this context, the Court has implicitly affirmed the jury’s role in 
making “public policy” determinations, like the appropriate level of 
protection against prurient media.193 Whether something is morally 
offensive is not, after all, a question demanding a choice between two 
opposite answers. Rather, like the issue of punitive damages, it admits 
of degrees. A host of policy choices may factor into the jury’s analysis 
because, in application of a three-prong test, the jury is 
representatively speaking for the community, and not just for a 
combination of the predispositions of individual jurors. 
Such would be the case with punitive damages. A jury could 
impose the community’s norms in an attempt to comply with the 
constitutional due process requirements. Then judicial review would 
not amount to squeezing the square peg of a jury’s moral judgment 
through the round hole of Gore’s guideposts test. Rather, the 
reviewing court would simply review a jury determination for 
compliance with the jury’s stated objective. Punitive damage awards 
which exceed nine times the actual damages would be reviewed for 
constitutionality with the assumption that the jury made a deliberate 
decision to inflict an extraordinary punishment because it determined 
that, in light of the reprehensibility factors, the defendant’s behavior 
was extraordinarily reprehensible and deserving of retribution and 
deterrence. This approach also honestly admits that reprehensibility 
is a mixed question of law and fact, and one that the jury has 
historically determined in its role vis-à-vis the professional judiciary. 
C. Resituating Fairness 
In many ways, this Note enters the current debate about the 
jury’s role in assigning punitive damages through the back door. 
Scholars evaluate the Court’s current doctrine on punitive damages in 
several ways. By far the dominant approach is an empirical analysis of 
the jury’s function. Some of these scholars interpret the data to 
indicate the inherent unfairness of the jury194 and others interpret the 
 
 193. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 33–34 (stating that the jury should decide what constitutes 
obscenity). 
 194. See Reid Hastie, Overview: What We Did and What We Found, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: 
HOW JURIES DECIDE, supra note 181, at 17, 25–26 (noting the biases and unpredictability of the 
jury deliberation process). See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Improving the Quality of Jury 
Decision Making, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 47, at 341 
(describing the difficulties and inherent unfairness of submitting very complex cases to juries). 
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data as neutral or favorable for the jury.195 Another approach is that 
of the synthesist, who argues for constitutional coherency and 
consistency.196 But synthesism, as an argument for coherence, does not 
always offer adequate support for one potential synthesis over 
another, and infrequently focuses on a narrow topic like Fourteenth 
Amendment limits on punitive damages. Yet another scholarly 
approach recounts the jury’s historical and political role.197 
This Note combines the latter two approaches, arguing that 
history and the political role of the jury urge the Court to synthesize 
the current punitive damages doctrine with the doctrines that 
acknowledge the jury as a source of morality in the area of capital 
punishment and obscenity. This approach deliberately sidesteps 
arguments about predictability in order to resituate fairness outside 
of the normative sway of empiricism. But that is not to deny the 
legitimacy of concerns about the predictability of punitive damages 
awards and the valuable role of empirical studies in evaluating the 
jury. It simply rejects the assumption that large awards are 
unpredictable and therefore unfair merely because they are large.198 
Rather, understanding the political purpose of the jury as a 
counterbalance to the professional judiciary and as a bellwether of 
 
 195. Eisenberg et al., supra note 184, at 264–66; Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, 
and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 779 (2002); Theodore 
Eisenberg et al., Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with Real-World Coherence in Punitive 
Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239, 1241–42 (2002); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the 
Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 178 (1958); Vidmar, supra note 186, at 
1399–1403. 
 196. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
1049, 1070–80 (2004) (arguing for a uniform constitutional approach to achieving proportional 
punishments in both the criminal and civil realms); Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The 
Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 880–83 
(2004) (noting a discrepancy between the Supreme Court’s handling of proportionality of 
punishment in the criminal and punitive damage contexts). 
 197. See Landsman, supra note 47, at 22 (recounting the history of the American civil jury 
system). See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 
(1964) (denying the notion that judges are inherently better at making decisions than juries); 
Landsman, supra note 96 (looking at the historical roots of the civil jury system); Landsman, 
supra note 18 (noting the adaptability of the jury in American history); White, supra note 181 
(stressing the importance of the Seventh Amendment throughout the history of the United 
States). 
 198. See Cass R. Sunstein, What Should Be Done?, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES 
DECIDE, supra note 181, at 242, 243 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002) (“If the purpose of 
[punitive damage] awards is retribution . . . the analysis would be different than if the purpose of 
such awards is to deter (optimally) future misconduct.”). Ultimately Sunstein concludes that 
“[w]hatever one’s views about the purpose of punitive damages awards, juries face extremely 
serious problems in producing sensible and coherent outcomes.” Id. 
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community norms suggests another take on many “unpredictable” 
jury awards: American communities are outraged by (often 
unregulated) industrial giants who recklessly or intentionally abuse 
the goodwill of consumers. In fact, such an interpretation of large 
punitive damages awards is both intuitively predictable, and therefore 
fair, as well as empirically testable.199 Not only are some punitive 
damages necessary to force defendants to internalize the costs of 
wrongdoing,200 but, more importantly, the constitutionally-mandated 
reprehensibility guidepost is inherently an unpredictable 
determination.201 Another interpretation may be that jury awards, 
following the example of jury awards in Massachusetts as that state 
diversified economically and morally,202 have become more 
unpredictable than before because of increasingly diverse moral 
convictions and economic situations of jurors in the United States. 
This Note, rather than enter the struggle to interpret empirical data, 
asserts the jury’s role in two areas beyond the purview of empirical 
studies: the constitutional structure of the United States and morality. 
CONCLUSION 
If the true source of a growing string of large punitive damages 
awards is nothing more than the jury doing exactly what the jury 
should do, then the Court should take the opportunity afforded by a 
case in which the punitive damages exceed compensatory damages by 
greater than nine times to reconsider its current punitive damage 
doctrine. The Fourteenth Amendment promises fairness, but it does 
not define reprehensibility. The historical and political role of the jury 
as a counterbalance to the professional judiciary demands—at a 
 
 199. Studies suggest, ironically, that jurors are likely to be outraged by pre-hoc cost-benefit 
analyses by civil defendants. See Cass R. Sunstein, Jurors and Judges as Risk Managers: 
Introduction, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE, supra note 181, at 109, 110 
(“[P]unitive damages awards increase . . . when companies have done [a cost-benefit analysis], 
even when a high value is placed on the key variables (such as life).”). 
 200. See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. 
REV. 1257, 1286 (1976) (noting, as regards the deterrence of punitive damages in products 
liability cases, that “[t]he greater the product’s profit potential and the less the likelihood that 
individual victims will seek recovery, the greater the need for a strong deterrent to reckless 
marketing decisions”). 
 201. See Daniel Kahneman, David A. Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage, Erratic 
Awards, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE, supra note 181, at 31, 31 (“Even when 
there is a consensus on punitive intent, there is no consensus about how much in the way of 
dollars is necessary to produce appropriate suffering in a defendant.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 202. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
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minimum—some deference to the jury’s moral judgment as to civil 
punishment. Allowing the jury some room to enforce moral standards 
gives play in the joints to federalism, and enhances the democratic 
legitimacy of judicial judgment. Ultimately, the Court begs the 
question about the constitutional legitimacy of large punitive 
damages awards when it assumes such awards must be the result of 
juror bias. Instead of ignoring such awards, perhaps judges should 
regard them as the result of good old-fashioned moral judgment 
applied to novel or particularly pernicious forms of wrongdoing. 
Reasonable people could disagree with any given jury judgment, but 
a judge should be hesitant to substitute her debatable judgment for 
the jury’s. 
